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We estimate that a hard Brexit (HB) would reduce UK agro-industrial-imports from the EU by
around 50%. Following the dismantling of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the UK
Government has proposed to shift towards market-oriented agricultural policies and negotiating
free trade agreements (FTAs) with interested countries. Members of Mercosur would then face
two negotiations in Europe: with the EU27 and with the UK. How should they allocate their
scarce negotiating resources and where should they invest their political capital? For a number of
reasons discussed in the text we argue that: (1) negotiations with the EU are unlikely to deliver
market access much in excess of what it has offered so far; (2) unlike these negotiations that have
dragged for around twenty years, there are circumstances indicating that in the event of Brexit, an
FTA with the UK could be completed in a relatively short period and, (3) failing Mercosur to
give these talks priority, other countries are more than likely to sign trade agreements with the
UK and fill its import gap thus creating additional trade diversion effects against its Members.
We offer back-of-the-envelope estimates indicating that under such an FTA, Mercosur could
double its agro-industrial exports to the UK.
1 INTRODUCTION
The UK is the second largest economy in the EU1 and therefore for some of the
products it trades, Brexit will have quite large effects.2 This is the case of several
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1 UK’s GDP exceeds the sum of the thirteen countries that joined the EU in this millennium plus the
three that joined in 1995. In this sense, Brexit would take the EU back to where it was some twenty-
five years ago.
2 These trade effects trigger macroeconomic consequences which among several others, have been
studied by HM Treasury (2016), and Minford and Miller (2016). While the study by HM Treasury
assumes a hard Brexit, Minford and Miller (who represent the group of ‘Economists for Brexit’),
assume that post-Brexit the UK adopts free trade policies and this in turn would increase GDP. For
critical views on these studies’ assumptions and results see Gudgin et al. (2017) on the Treasury report,
and Sampson et al. (2016) and Winters (2017) on Minford’s analysis.
agro-industrial products which we study here with a view to assessing the trade
interests of Mercosur in the European market.
Under Brexit the bilateral trade policy that would eventually be agreed
upon will fall within two extreme outcomes: (1) a HB where both partners
initially adopt the EU MFN (most-favoured-nation) tariffs for trading among
themselves and, (2) a most liberal trading arrangement. Both extremes are
unlikely but not impossible. A HB would shatter trade flows to an extent
that important pressure groups are opposing with strength in the UK. On the
other hand, a very open bilateral trade policy like that between the EU and
EEA (European Economic Area) members implies that in exchange for acces-
sing the common market the UK would have to maintain open borders to the
movement of persons and contribute financially to its social objectives. Because
both of these policies are included among the UK red lines, the odds are also
against a very liberal bilateral trade policy (Gasoriek et al. 2016).
A HB is the worst case scenario and estimating its trade effects is likely to
overstate the opportunities and challenges that third countries would face in the
UK market. Still, until a clearer picture emerges from the negotiations, in the
case of agro-industrial products, the exercise remains useful for at least three
reasons: (1) in contrast to the number of papers that have quantified the
aggregate trade effects of a HB, there is scant work focused on agro-industrial
trade3; (2) there is also scant work on its impact on developing countries4 and,
(3) contrasting with the FTAs signed by the EU where the agro-industrial
chapter is usually highly restrictive of temperate agricultural products, the UK
has been quite explicit that post-Brexit it would liberalize food imports.
Following Brexit and the dismantling of the CAP, it will be the first time
since 1973 when the UK joined the EU, that third countries will face close to a
level playing ground with the EU as competing suppliers to the market of one
of its former members. How important is this for agro-industrial products? In
2016 the UK imported USD 43,480 million of agro-industrial products from
the EU and we estimate that a HB would reduce this bilateral trade by around
50%.5 In order to minimize the impact of Brexit on food prices, the UK will
have to compensate with imports from non-EU suppliers.
3 Exceptions include Bellora et al. (2017), and Yu et al. (2017) cited in Mathews (2018).
4 Mathews (2018) is a salient exception.
5 For this paper we identify agro-industrial products as those contained in the first twenty-four chapters
of the Harmonized System (HS).
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Faced with the reality of Brexit, Mercosur will eventually have to decide the
priority to be given to negotiating an FTA with the UK.6 We call attention to the
importance of this opportunity over other negotiations particularly between the
Mercosur and the EU where strong political leaders are clearly not enthusiastic or
directly apposing them. For example regarding these talks, Cecilia Malmstrom the EU
Commissioner for Trade, has stated that: ‘We are particularly careful when it comes to
negotiations with partners who are strong exporters of our sensitive products. That’s
howwe are approaching theMercosur negotiations and the question of beef exports in
particular… But let me be clear, we will not make any commitments that go further
than what sensitive sectors can handle’ (Malmstrom 2016).
The remaining discussion is organized as follows. Section II presents an aggre-
gate picture of the structure of UK-agro-industrial trade with the EU and with
Mercosur while section III offers estimates of the quantitative impact of a HB on UK
imports. Section IV calls attention to some structural economic factors occurring
since the early millennium years that point towards a decreasing likelihood of the EU
improving its market access offer to Mercosur. Section V discusses non-economic
advantages of negotiating an FTA with the UK and also presents back-of-the-
envelope estimates on Mercosur’s export potential in meat and agro-industrial
products to the UK market. Concluding remarks are presented in Section VI.
2 UK AGRO-INDUSTRIAL TRADE WITH THE EU AND
MERCOSUR
The EU is by far the major trade partner of the UK but because of its growing
deficit in goods, over time the relative importance of this market has shifted.7
Table 1 shows that while in 2001 the EU accounted for 59% of aggregate
UK exports, by 2016 it had declined to 47%. On the import side the opposite
occurred: in 2001 UK imports from this source accounted for 50% of the total but
by 2016 it had increased to 52% (Table 2). During this period, the UK’s aggregate
trade with the Mercosur countries remained negligible at less than 1%.
6 In emphasizing the importance of a Mercosur-UK FTA, delicate political and geo-political issues will have
to be overcome. Because I am not an expert on these themes, I will not deal with them here, but will only
point to the fact that there currently appears to be constructive spirits on all parts. I remind that on 23 May
2018 when honouring Argentina’s soldiers that died in the Malvinas war, Boris Johnson UK’s Chancellor
at the time said: ‘I wish this will be a new chapter in our relationship and a signal for strengthening trade
ties after the UK leaves the EU’ (author’s translation from a note entitled: ‘Por primera vez un Cancliller
Británico homenajeó en la Argentina a los caídos en las Malvinas’ published in Ámbito Financiero (2018)),
http://www.ambito.com/921833-por-primera-vez-un-canciller-britanico-homenajeo-en-la-argentina-a-
los-caidos-en-malvinas. Likewise, Marcos Peña, Argentina’s Chief Cabinet Minister visited London to pay
respect to the UK soldiers who perished in this war, https://www.elpatagonico.com/marcos-pena-home-
najeo-los-soldados-ingleses-caidos-malvinas-n3075286 (Feb. 2019).
7 This deficit in goods has been counterbalanced by a growing surplus in services trade.
MERCOSUR’S NEGOTIATIONS WITH EUROPE 345
T
ab
le
1
U
K
A
gg
re
ga
te
an
d
A
gr
o-
In
du
str
ia
lE
xp
or
ts
to
th
e
E
U
,
to
th
e
W
or
ld
an
d
to
M
er
co
su
r
(m
ill
io
n
U
SD
)
T
yp
e
o
f
go
o
d
s
E
xp
o
rt
s
to
th
e
E
U
E
xp
o
rt
s
to
th
e
w
o
rl
d
E
U
sh
ar
e
(%
)
E
xp
o
rt
s
to
th
e
M
er
co
su
r
M
er
co
su
r’
s
sh
ar
e
20
01
20
16
20
01
20
16
20
01
20
16
20
01
20
16
20
01
20
16
A
gr
o-
in
du
st
ri
al
8,
84
3
17
,5
03
14
,5
20
28
,8
84
60
.9
%
60
.6
%
31
2
23
2
2.
2%
0.
8%
A
ll
go
od
s
16
5,
64
8
19
3,
56
3
27
9,
42
5
41
1,
46
3
59
.3
%
47
.0
%
2,
11
3
3,
29
9
0.
8%
0.
8%
A
gr
o-
in
du
st
ri
al
sh
ar
e
(%
)
5.
3%
9.
0%
5.
2%
7.
0%
na
na
14
.8
%
7.
0%
na
na
na
:
no
t
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
.
So
ur
ce
:
D
at
a
fr
om
T
ra
de
m
ap
.
346 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE
T
ab
le
2
U
K
A
gg
re
ga
te
an
d
A
gr
o-
In
du
str
ia
lI
m
po
rts
fro
m
th
e
E
U
,
fro
m
th
e
W
or
ld
an
d
fro
m
M
er
co
su
r
(m
ill
io
n
U
SD
)
T
yp
e
o
f
go
o
d
s
Im
p
o
rt
s
fr
o
m
E
U
Im
p
o
rt
s
fr
o
m
w
o
rl
d
E
U
sh
ar
e
(%
)
Im
p
o
rt
s
fr
o
m
M
er
co
su
r
M
er
co
su
r’
s
sh
ar
e
20
01
20
16
20
01
20
16
20
01
20
16
20
01
20
16
20
01
20
16
A
gr
o-
in
du
st
ri
al
18
,6
51
43
,4
80
30
,4
31
61
,3
11
61
.3
%
70
.9
%
1,
22
0
2,
04
2
4.
0%
3.
3%
A
ll
go
od
s
18
0,
90
1
33
0,
60
6
35
8,
70
3
63
6,
36
8
50
.4
%
52
.0
%
2,
89
9
4,
43
2
0.
8%
0.
7%
A
gr
o-
in
du
st
ri
al
sh
ar
e
(%
)
10
.3
%
13
.2
%
8.
5%
9.
6%
na
na
42
.1
%
46
.1
%
na
N
a
na
:
no
t
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
.
So
ur
ce
:
D
at
a
fr
om
T
ra
de
m
ap
.
MERCOSUR’S NEGOTIATIONS WITH EUROPE 347
Graph 1 shows the growing trade deficit of the UK in agro-industrial trade
with the EU. As seen, this deficit has been driven mainly by a relatively fast import
growth that peaked in 2014 with nearly USD 50,000 million. Although since then
these imports declined to around USD 43,400 million in 2016, by historical
standards they remain at a relatively high level. This has obvious implications for
the relevance of the impact of Brexit on UK imports of these products and
therefore, on the export opportunities that it would offer to third countries.
Graph 1 Exports, Imports and Balance of UK of Aggregate Agro-Industrial Trade with
the EU (million USD)
-40.000
-20.000
0
20.000
40.000
60.000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Exports Imports Trade balance
Source: Data from Trademap.
The UK dependence on the EU as a source of supply of these products has increased by
10% points from 61% in 2001 to 71% in 2016 when they totalled USD 43,480 million
(Table 2). In contrast, the share of the EU in UK exports remained relatively constant
suggesting that under prevailing CAP policies, in these products the UK has a relative
but artificial competitive disadvantage. This and related issues discussed below have led
some observers as well as theUK government to call into question the presumed benefits
of the CAP to the development of its agricultural sector.
During this period, theUK import share of agro-industrial products fromMercosur
declined from 4% to 3.3% (Table 2) which contrast with Mercosur s participation in
world agro-industrial exports growing from 6.6% in 2001, to 8.1% in 2016. This
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contrasting performance is to an important extent the consequence of trade diversion
effects triggered by the CAP as well as the recent enlargements of the EU.8
Table 3 shows UK’s imports from the EU and from Mercosur for the five most
traded agro-industrial chapters. In 2016 these imports totalled USD 20,568 million
equivalent to 85% of the UK’s imports of these products from the EU (USD 24,196
million). In contrast, the share of imports of these same products from the Mercosur
accounted for only 1.3%.
Table 3 UK Imports from the EU and from Mercosur for Five Selected HS Chapters:
2016 (million USD)
HS
chapter
Product
UK aggre-
gate imports
UK imports
from the EU
UK imports
from Mercosur
Share in UK
agro-industrial
imports from (1)
EU Mercosur
2 Meats 5,460 4,670 184 86% 3%
4
Milk, dairy
products
3,502 3,359 3 96% 0%
19
Cereal and milk
preparations
3,975 3,629 1 91% 0%
20
Preparations of
fruits and
vegetables
3,409 2,860 25 84% 1%
22
Alcoholic bev-
erages, vinegar
7,850 6,050 105 77% 1%
Total 24,196 20,568 318 85% 1.3%
(1) The shares in the bottom line are in relation to the total in column 4. Source: Data from
Trademap.
3 IMPACT OF A HB ON UK AGRO-INDUSTRIAL TRADE
Relying on average MFN tariff rates and import elasticities at the two-digit level of
the HS, Lawless and Morgenroth (2016) estimated that a HB would reduce UK-
EU aggregate trade somewhere between 22% and 31%.9 In this section we use
8 In some cases, the share of the EU in UK agro-industrial imports has grown very fast. For example,
between 2001 and 2015 these shares grew as follows: frozen boneless meat from 40% to 80%; chicken
meat from 78% to 90%; and wine from 40% to 70%. Nogués (2017) discusses evidence of trade
diversion effects created by the Mercosur and EU trade policies against each other.
9 The width of the range depends on alternative assumptions regarding the elasticity of import demand.
For HS Ch. i the proportional trade reduction effect of a HB is estimated by the following expression:
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these authors’ data for distinguishing between the impact of a HB on agro-
industrial products (first twenty-four HS chapters), and the rest (HS chapters 25
to 99) which we call manufactures.10 We also present simulations of impacts at the
more disaggregated level of HS chapters.
The third column of Table 4 shows the simple average MFN tariffs for agro-
industrial and manufactured products while the fourth column presents the simple
average proportional trade reduction effect of a HB. The important difference
between the trade impacts of a HB on both of these groups (50% v. 22%) is to a
great extent the consequence of an average MFN tariff for agro-industrial products
that is four times the level for manufactures (16% v. 4%). Under these parameters
and using 2016 trade figures, a HB would reduce UK agro-industrial imports from
the EU by USD 21,653 million. Under a HB UK’s agro-industrial exports to the
EU would also decline by around 50%. In 2016 the UK exported to this destina-
tion agro-industrial products for a total of USD 17,503 million so a HB would
leave this bilateral trade at USD 8,750 million. The resulting negative net trade
effect of around USD 13,000 million is significant.
Table 4 Simple Average EU MFN Tariff Rates and Trade Reduction Impacts of a HB on
UK Imports of Agro-Industrial and Manufactured Products from the EU: 2016 (million USD)
Products HS chapters
Simple aver-
age MFN
tariff
Simple aver-
age import
reduction
UK imports
from de EU
Import
reduction
Agro-industrial 1–24 16% 49.8% 43,480 21,653
Manufactures 25–99 4% 22.3% 287,126 64,029
Source: Average MFN tariffs and import reduction effects have been inferred from Lawless
and Morgenroth (2016) as explained in Appendix A. Trade data from Trademap.
Table 5 shows average MFN tariffs for the same five HS agro-industrial chapters
listed in Table 3. Except for alcoholic beverages, the tariffs for the other chapters
ΔMi/Mi=tixei where M: value of UK imports from the EU; t: EU MFN tariff rate, and e; import
demand elasticity.
10 The extent to which the methodology used by Lawless and Morgenroth (2016) offers more or less
precision than the alternative of gravity equations that characterizes most studies including that by the
UK Treasury (2016), has been carefully analysed by Gudgin et al. (2017). These authors conclude that the
UK Treasury Report (2016) seriously overestimates the negative trade effects of a HB as it overlooked the
fact that on average after joining the EU, the UK harvested lower benefits in trade in goods than other
members also joining this market. After adjusting for this omission and re-estimating the gravity equations
initially presented inHMTreasury (2016), Gudgin et al. (2017) conclude that the aggregate impact of a HB
estimated by Lawless and Morgenroth (2016) ‘based solely on tariffs may thus be nearer the true impact
than any estimate based on gravity models.’ (at 32). Our estimates take comfort from this conclusion.
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are very high with meats and dairy products being the most protected. In fact,
these chapters have the highest and fourth highest MFN tariffs among the ninety-
nine HS chapters computed by Lawless and Morgenroth (2016). Moving from
near free trade as a EU member to adoption of these high MFN tariffs would
trigger a 71% reduction of UK imports of these products or by USD 14,996
million at 2016 prices (from USD 21,117 million). Applying the same proportional
reduction effects to the UK exports to the EU leaves a net trade deficit at around
USD 9,600 million with meat and preparations of fruits and vegetables experien-
cing the highest negative net trade reduction effects.
These estimates are likely to be on the conservative side as the weighted
average MFN tariff is quite higher than the simple average used in Table 4:
63.4% vs 49.8%. There are four other adjustments that would increase the trade
impacts of a HB and three that would reduce them.11 First, within each HS
chapter there usually are several products and their individual MFN tariff can
be quite different from the average rate. Depending on the patterns of produc-
tion and trade, these differences are of consequence to different agricultural
exporters.12
Second, estimates have not taken into account that post-Brexit UK-EU agro-
industrial trade may have to overcome higher non-tariff barriers (NTBs) than the
existing ones. In fact, the study by Bellora et al. (2017) indicates that for many
agro-industrial products, the costs of NTBs such as those that have to be incurred
for meeting sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, are higher than the MFN tariffs
(Bellora et al. Table 4). This is part of the reason why these authors find an impact
of a HB on agro-industrial trade of 62% which is higher than our estimate of 50%.
Third, we are not taking into account the fact that a HB also implies the end of the
UK membership to the FTAs signed by the EU. In general as noted above, the
liberalization of agro-industrial products in these FTAs is not that significant
particularly for temperate agricultural products but still there may be exceptions
that could affect some products.13 Finally, we are also not taking into account the
fact that post Brexit UK-EU trade will have to meet rules of origin and eventually
trade-defence measures that would add further negative trade effects on bilateral
trade flows.
11 (delete this parenthesis used in Table 4 Using the weighted average estimate of 63,4% translates into an
import contraction of USD 27,566 million i.e. a difference of USD 5,913 million with the figure
actually used of USD 21,653. In order to be conservative we have chosen to base comments on the
basis of the simple average MFN tariff.
12 S. V presents tariff estimates for different meats that show a wide range of variation.
13 This trade effect is unlikely to be long-lasting as we do not expect major problems in the UK arriving at trade
agreements with Commonwealth countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand whom for many if
not most agro-industrial products have the potential to substitute the EU as a source of supply (Politico 2018).
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There are also a couple of reasons indicating why our numbers could be over-
estimating the true numbers. First, the negative impact that further declines in the value
of the pound could have on UK imports. Second and most significant, our estimates do
not take into account the fact that several agro-industrial products (particularly meats and
dairy products) enter the EU under tariff-rate-quotas (TRQs) paying zero or low tariffs
for in-quota imports. This implies that the average effective tariff rate of the meat chapter
is lower than the bound EU MFN simple average of 49.3%.14 Finally, as the UK also
exports agro-industrial products to the EU, Brexit would lower them thus increasing
domestic supply of these products partly compensating its estimated import reduction
effect. Nevertheless, the extent to which UK exports to the EU are close substitutes of
imports from this origin is a matter of further research.
4 MERCOSUR’S TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU
Paraguay and Uruguay have long motivated Argentina and Brazil to move
forward with the Mercosur trade negotiations. Nevertheless, under populist
governments these countries (particularly Argentina) reversed their earlier
trade liberalization programs and for a decade or so up to late 2015, their
salient policy was to admit highly troubled Venezuela into the group. Populism
brought not only external paralysis but also and what has been more destruc-
tive, a significant retrogression within-market liberalization and flagrant viola-
tions of multilateral rules. Argentina by imposing quantitative restrictions on all
imports and on major exportables, violated not only the CET (common
external tariff), but also several WTO agreements, a behaviour that brought
several Members to challenge such actions within the dispute settlement
mechanism (Baracat et al. 2015).
Under new governments these countries are now more sympathetic to outward-
oriented policies and Mercosur is once again moving forward with its trade negotiat-
ing agenda. In addition to adding impetus and enthusiasm to the vintage-old discus-
sions with the EU, trade talks have apparently been initiated with some other
countries.15 The complementarity between the economies of Mercosur and the EU
has long been noticed: Mercosur holding a strong comparative advantage in agro-
industrial products while the EU showing its stronghold mostly in manufactures,
services and intellectual property. Despite the significance of the gains that could be
achieved by an ambitious FTA, after close to twenty years since the initial exchange of
14 I appreciate an anonymous referee for pointing to the importance of this adjustment.
15 For a list of ongoing Mercosur trade negotiations see www.sice.oas.gov. Brazil’ s new finance Minister
has stated that his country would propose to the other Mercosur members shifting their trade
agreement from a common market to a FTA. Nevertheless formal discussions on this proposal have
not been initiated nor has any date been announced for this to happen.
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market offers took place, these negotiations remain to be completed.16 On the surface
and from the perspective of Mercosur, one of the salient reasons for this situation has
been the EU unwillingness to offer concessions in agro-industrial products of an order
of magnitude that would translate into a balanced agreement.17 Nevertheless we also
stress that the failure to reach agreement is functional to the interests of highly
protected and politically powerful Mercosur industries (Nogués 2004).
Since then, three events have reduced even more the likelihood of the EU coming
closer to Mercosur’s revealed market access demands. First, the trade effects of the 2004,
2007 and 2013 enlargements of the EU to thirteen central and eastern European
countries (CEECs) many of which have comparative advantage in agro-industrial
products (Anderson and Swinnen 2009). These enlargements increased the EU28
degree of self-sufficiency to the detriment of competitive agricultural exporters
(Drabik and others 2007 and Nogués 2017).18
Second, the EU-Canada FTA known as CETA (Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement) that entered into force in September 2017 has been characterized as
ambitious in terms of the market access concessions given by the EU in agro-industrial
products (Government of Canada 2017, and European Commission 2017).19 Under
CETA many agro-industrial tariff lines where Mercosur is competitive, have been
liberalized including fresh apples, animal feed, wheat flower, and dairy products. Also,
under CETA Canada is allowed to raise its exports to the EU in stages to 50,000 tons
of duty-free beef, as well as 80,000 tons of pork (Reuters 2017a). The beef quota is
only 20,000 tons lower than that offered by the EU to Mercosur but while in 2016
16 This initial exchange took place in 2001 at the IV Meeting of the Birregional Negotiating Committee
(BNC, Comite Birregional de Negociaciones) where the EU already showed minimal interest in
liberalizing trade in temperate agricultural products (Nogus 2004). Since then, the BNC has met more
than twenty times to no avail.
17 Several media articles have informed about these tensions adding specifically that the size of the EU
beef quota offered to Mercosur remains a sticking point. On the other hand, we say ‘apparently’
because the slow pace of progress, is functional to highly protected and politically powerful Mercosur
industries (particularly in Argentina and Brazil), that in the event of a trade agreement would suffer
displacements by imports from the EU.
18 These new acceding countries had to increase the rate of assistance to their agro-industrial sectors up to
the level mandated by the CAP expanding the negative trade consequences of these policies. For
example, Drabik et al. (2007) have noted that: ‘a review of the detailed data shows that there are many
cases when the gradual liberalization increased Slovakia’s agricultural imports from the EU15 + CEEC
(Central and Eastern European Countries) while at the same time Slovakia agricultural imports from
the ROW decreased. This is an indication that imports from the EU15 + CEEC, which are positively
discriminated against, replaced imports from the ROW, an indication of trade diversion’.
19 These declining incentives for the EU to offer the sufficient market space to Mercosur in order to
arrive at an agreement is made nowhere more clear than in the case of beef. According to Mathews
(2018): ‘The EU has gradually reduced the proposed amount of beef it would accept from the
Mercosur from 100,000 tons per year in 2004, to 78,000 tons in 2016, to 70,000 tons in 2017’. As
indicated below, this trend has been influenced by increasing imports from the CEECs substituting
EU15 imports that previously came from third countries.
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Canada’s world beef exports amounted to 309 thousand tons (fresh and frozen bovine
meat), Mercosur’s was 8,918 thousand tons, i.e. 29 times higher!20
Finally, because as seen above Brexit would reduce EU’s agro-industrial
exports to the UK quite significantly, the resulting excess supply will put
downward pressures on continental food prices increasing the already high
resistance by these farmers to further import competition.21 Mathews (2018)
adds that ‘Brexit also makes the EU a less attractive potential partner, and may
make it more difficult for the EU to negotiate as favorable terms in future trade
deals as it might otherwise have done’ (page 12).22
Brexit entails other bad news for EU farmers as the UK puts more financial
resources into the EU budget than it takes from it. Preliminary estimates
suggest that unless other donors meaning Germany in particular, close the
funding shortfall implied by Brexit, farmers in the continent could face an
average cut in the CAP subsidies they are now receiving by around 5%
(Reuters 2017).
Therefore, if in the early years of the millennium a balanced and ambitious
Mercosur-EU FTA remained a long shot, these three events (the EU enlargements to
the CEEC-Central and Eastern European Countries); the agro-industrial concessions
granted by the EU to Canada under CETA and other FTAs and most importantly, the
trade and financial consequences of Brexit), have put such a goal even further out of
reach.23 Perhaps given these factors and the uncertainties that nationalists and populist
forces have brought into the EU, in the event of Brexit, the priority of Mercosur’s
negotiations with these two partners may have to be reconsidered in order to get the
highest payoff from the scarce negotiating resources it has at its disposal.24
20 Because of the important concessions given by the EU to Canada, CETA is probably the salient example of
why our commission in S III to include the impact of Brexit ending the UK’s membership in the FTAs signed
by the EU, leads to an underestimate of the export opportunities thatMercosur would eventually face under a
HB in the UK market. Nevertheless as mentioned above, post-Brexit leaders of Commonwealth countries
such as Canada have stated that they are prepared to engage in trade talks soon after Brexit (Politico 2018).
21 This reluctance has been made quite clear by France and other EU members (RFI 2018) and as
indicated above, by Commissioner Malmstron.
22 During 2016 UK beef imports from the EU amounted to USD 4,670 million and a HB would
eliminate most of this trade thereby pushing lower beef prices in the continent. This impact would be
partially compensated by lower UK beef exports to the EU but there still remains a significant negative
net trade impact (Table 5). The EU could also try to seek new buyers in international markets for its
Brexit-induced excess food supply adding competitive pressures on Mercosurs exports. In this paper,
we do not address this effect.
23 Suggestions from academic circles that the EU should be less ambitious than seeking an FTA with
Mercosur have also been made (Messerlin 2013). In part, this view is driven by concerns regarding the
uncertain spirit of openness that Mercosur showed at the time.
24 It has now been several years since the objectives of the founding fathers of European integration
appear to be challenged by problems that could not have been foreseen at the time. See Germond
(2009) for an historical discussion of Europe s integration process.
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5 ABOUT A MERCOSUR-UK FTA
In agro-industrial products Mercosur and the UK are also complementary
economies so given their size, the gains from an FTA would be quite impor-
tant, perhaps more than any other trade deal being considered except with the
EU.25 In addition, in the event of Brexit, a number of non-economic con-
siderations also make such an FTA attractive. After summarizing them, this
section will discuss briefly the future of the UK’s agricultural policies and
finally, it offers back-of-the-envelope estimates of the impacts that a HB
could have on Mercosur’s meat and agro-industrial exports generally, to the
UK.
5.1 NON-ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Four non-economic considerations make the UK attractive as a partner with
whom to complete a relevant FTA. First, although ongoing conversations suggests
that it may be delayed, at the moment of completing the revision of this paper
Brexit deadline is late March 2019 with a transition period lasting until December
2020. This is important and quite unique among trade negotiations that generally
have no deadline and consequently can drag on for years as the Mercosur-EU
discussions show. Second, the broad nature of the market exchange that would
characterize a Mercosur-UK FTA is expected not to be very different from the
exchange being discussed with the EU: essentially a liberalization of Mercosur’s
services, protected manufactures and strengthening of intellectual property in
exchange for greater access to agro-industrial markets. Therefore, the experience
gained through years of negotiating with the EU can fruitfully be used for talks
with the UK and this is certainly a time-saving factor. Third, given that the UK
GDP is approximately one sixth the size of the EU28, Mercosur’s concessions need
not be as important as those demanded by the EU. This should help to placate
domestic pressure groups thereby increasing the likelihood of reaching an
agreement.26
Finally, a draft agreement with the UK should be relatively easy to have
ratified by the five Parliaments particularly given the fact that the UK government
has expressed quite clearly that upon leaving the EU, it will be moving to a
market-oriented agricultural sector much as it was before joining it in 1973.
25 In practically all of the first twenty-four HS chapters where the UK records a trade deficit, Mercosur
shows a surplus.
26 Although in this paper our aim is to stress the importance of a Mercosur-UK FTA for its export
interests, we recognize that there are other significant gains to be achieved through increased import-
competition (perhaps more important than the export gains quantified below) as Mercosur remains a
highly protected group of economies.
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These four aspects (closeness of Brexit deadline; accumulated negotiating experi-
ence with the EU; the relatively higher likelihood of reaching an agreement and
the relative easiness of ratification), increase the attractiveness of negotiating an
FTA with the UK.
5.2 THE FUTURE OF THE UK’s agricultural policies
In early 2018, theUKSecretary of State for Environment, Food andRural Affairs (2018)
presented to the Parliament a document for public consultation entitled: ‘Health and
Harmony: the future for food, farming and environment in a green Brexit’ outlining
objectives for its agricultural sector that depart loudly from those that have prevailed
under the CAP. Some excerpts from the prologue read as follows: ‘For more than forty
years the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy has decided how we farm our land, the
food we grow and rear the state of the natural environment. Over the period the
environment has deteriorated, productivity has been held back and public health has
been compromised’,27 and CAP subsidies which have been ‘skewed to those with the
biggest landholdings has kept land prices and rents high … and held back innovation’
(page 5).28
In this document the Government’s policy proposals are expected to result in a
‘more dynamic, more self-reliant agriculture industry as we continue to compete
internationally’ (page 6). By dismantling the CAP subsidies the post-Brexit policy
direction would be towards a market-oriented agricultural sector and although
subsidies are proposed to continue, they would not be tied to land size as in the
CAP but to environmental goals: the catch phrase is ‘public money spent on public
goods’.29 Regarding trade policies, the proposal emphasizes signing FTAs with
countries that currently have agreements with the EU and also, ‘with a number of
countries that have a keen interest in doing so’ (page 62).30 This UK interest in
signing trade agreements is driven at least in part by the impact that Brexit would have
on domestic food prices.
27 Similar and serious damages to the environment attributable to the CAP are also occurring in the
continent (Stijins 2018).
28 As has been the case with several other countries, after joining the EU in 1973 theUKhad to adopt the highly
protectionist CAP policies. The suggestion that decades of agricultural policies under the CAP have not been
good for UK agriculture has previously been made among others by Helm (2016) and Swinbank (2017).
29 As agricultural policies are part of the devolved administration, the proposals in the document apply to
England while Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will be free to decide their own policies. Because
in these regions, the CAP subsidies provide the bulk of farmer’s income, dismantling and substituting
them with other forms of assistance will be quite more challenging (Mathews 2018).
30 Also given that in the future subsidies for agricultural related public goods will have to compete with
subsidies for areas such as health and education, it appears unlikely that public money for this sector
will remain at the level currently available under the CAP. The UK government has confirmed that
such a level will be maintained until 31 Dec. 2020 but there is no commitment after this date.
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Research byClarke et al. (2017) concludes that under aHB food prices would rise
well above average inflation. These authors report the following adjustments of
consumer prices: dairy products: 8%; oils and fats: 8% and meat: 6%. These effects
are over and above the impact that a lower pound has already had on prices. Also, a
Brexit-induced food price inflation would be tilted against the lowest quintiles and the
unemployed. Confronted with such a situation the UK would likely move quite
rapidly to secure food supplies by liberalizing trade.31
5.3 ASSESSING THE MERCOSUR EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES: BACK-OF-THE-ENVELOPE
ESTIMATES
In assessing a Mercosur-UK agreement it is also important to stress the implications
of the choice faced by the UK of eventually liberalizing unilaterally priority sectors
including some food products, or negotiating access to its market through FTAs.
Mercosur could certainly wait for unilateral liberalization but: Which products
would the UK liberalize first? By how much? Would these products be the ones
where it has a strong comparative advantage? and most importantly: How high
would tariff discrimination against Mercosur exports be in a non-FTA scenario
while other efficient exporters including Commonwealth countries move in and
sign trade agreements with the UK? In fact, informal talks are already moving
forward with some of these countries, and common sense suggests that in the event
of Brexit, FTAs with them would be completed sooner rather than later.
Therefore, the option of Mercosur waiting for the UK to implement unilateral
liberalization is risky and as has been the case with the enlargements of the EU and
other agreements, a late reaction is unlikely to retain the trade opportunities that
could be seized early on in the post-Brexit period.32 In what follows, we offer
back-of-the-envelope estimates that illustrate the export opportunities that a HB
could eventually open to Mercosur.
5.3[a] Meat Exports
As hinted above, the fact that in spite of the strong export performance of Mercosur
as the leading world meat exporter illustrated in Graph 2, the fraction that has gone
to the EU is well out of proportion. In 2016 the EU imported meat for a total of
USD 41,418 million of which Mercosur’s share was 5.4% while its share in world
meat exports was close to three times higher: 14.9%.
31 For a number of reasons listed in their paper, Clarke et al. (2017) conclude that their food price
estimates are conservative.
32 The history of Mercosur is also one characterized by a chain of trade integration opportunities that it
let pass.
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Graph 2 World Meat Exports (million USD)
Source: Data from Trademap.
Graph 3 UK Meat Imports from the EU as a Proportion of UK’s Aggregate Meat
Imports
Source: Data from Trademap.
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Graph 3 shows that the UK has increasingly relied on meat imports from the EU and in
2016 the share from this origin reached 86% (equivalent to USD 4,670 million) while
Mercosur’s share was only 3%. Although a number of factors can account for this high
degree ofmarket specialization, the CAP is a primary suspect. In a non-CAPworld these
import shares would likely be quite different and this assertion can be partly supported by
going back to 2001 before the EU enlargements to the CEEC countries. Then
Mercosur’s share in UK meat imports was 7% (more than two times higher than in
2016), while the EU15 share was 78% (8% points lower than the share it had in 2016).
The EU enlargement goes a long way in explaining the important decline inMercosur’s
share in the UKmarket. For example, in 2001 Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria
accounted for a mere 0.1% of the UKs meat imports but by 2016 their share had
increased to 14%.
Brexit would partially reverse this this EU increasing degree of selfsufficiency
in agro-industrial products. How could this impact on Mercosur’s exports?
A first approximation is offered in Table 6. Here columns 3 and 4 show UK
imports from the EU for different kinds of meats while column 5 shows estimates of
MFN tariffs at the four-digit level of the HS (appendix B for the details). The numbers
here range from an average MFN tariff of 31% for pig-meat, to 92% for frozen bovine
meat. Applying uniformly an import elasticity of −1.9 (appendix A) inferred from the
data in Lawless and Morgenroth (2016)33 the resulting trade effects are presented in
columns 6 and 8. According to these numbers, in quantity terms aHBwould curtail UK
meat imports from the EU by 80% (1.2 million tons) and 83% in value terms (USD
3,895 million). The hardest hit imports would be chicken and bovine meat and the EU
exporters that would be most affected would be Netherlands for chicken meat and
Ireland for bovine meat (see also Donellan and Hanrahan 2016, and Swinbank 2017).
Part of this import contraction would be compensated by lower exports from the UK to
the EU that Brexit would also trigger.34
Eventually, these estimates need to be adjusted by the agreement to be
reached between the UK and the EU regarding the apportionment of the
imports that now enter the EU under tariff-rate-quotas according to which
in-quota volumes pay zero or very low tariffs while out-of-quota imports pay
the high bound MFN tariff used in our estimates.35 Several meat products now
33 For the sake of comparison, we also present estimates with an import demand elasticity of −1 shown in
columns 7 and 9.
34 Although probably the extent to which these meat exports are close substitutes of meat imports is low.
35 In 2017 the UK and the EU reached an agreement in principle regarding this apportionment but
it was later contested by some meat exporting countries. The agreement in principle is that:
‘The UK share of a given quota was worked out by determining the UK’s usage share (expressed
in percentage) and applying it to the tariff-rate-quota volume.’ (European Commission 2018). In
any case, omiting the impact of TRQs implies an overestimation of post Brexit UK import
demand as our numbers are based solely on MFN tariffs.
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enter the EU under TRQs.36 As a first approximation, for any given product,
the impact of a HB determined by the MFN tariff as presented in Table 6
should be netted by the in-quota volume that the UK will eventually receive
following Brexit.37
Keeping in mind this adjustment as well as others listed above,38 where could
a HB leave Mercosur’s meat exports to the UK? Constant-share analysis is a
simple way of providing a back-of-the-envelope estimate. Under the follow-
ing assumptions and using 2016 trade data, in the event that it signs an FTA
with the UK, Mercosur could increase its meat exports quite significantly if:
Trade flow Meat Agro-industrial
Pre-Brexit UK imports from EU 4,670 43,480
Post-Brexit UK imports from EU 723 21,827
UK import contraction from HB 3,947 21,653
UK import contraction net of 25% assumed to be supplied by
the EU
2,960 16,240
World exports net of intra EU trade 74,895 1,025,534
Word exports net of trade with the EU:
– Mercosur 14,950 94,674
– US 14,381 128,053
– Australia 15,506 28,749
– Canada 4,635 47,667
– EU net 11,395 145,202
Source: Data from Trademap.
36 The list of products entering the EU under TRQs and the agreement in principle of the UK share can
be consulted in European Commission (2018). TRQs are particularly relevant for meat and dairy
products.
37 For example, in Table 6 we estimate that a HB would eliminate UK imports from the EU of
salted, dried and smoked meat equivalent to 249,829 tons. Nevertheless, currently in the EU
Brazil has a TRQ for salted poultry meat of 170,807 tons and the agreement in principle is that
the UK would receive a 28.9% share or 40,877 tons (European Commission 2018). Assuming
that post-Brexit and through liberalization measures the UK returns to its pre-Brexit level of
imports, the opportunities for other exporting countries have to be estimated by netting out
Brazil’s quota.
38 Several of which we remind, would increase the trade effects.
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(1) over time the UK returns to its pre HB level of meat imports from the
EU; (2) facilitated by years of common administration of the EU’s NTBs and/
or under an FTA, post-Brexit the EU supplies 25% of the compensating
increase in UK imports assumed in (1) and, (3) third countries fill the
remaining 75% in proportion to their share in world meat exports net of
the EU.39 In 2016, Mercosur’s share in world meat exports was 20% so
applying this proportion to the increase in the UK’s imports (USD 2,960
million), yields USD 592 million of additional meat exports to the UK which
is more than three times what Mercosur actually exported to this market in
that year (USD 184 million).40
5.3[b] Agro-Industrial Exports
Under the three assumptions listed above for meat trade, following a HB
Mercosur would eventually export around USD 1,600 million more of agro-
industrial products to the UK (=share of Mercosur in world agro-industrial
exports net of intra EU trade -11.3%- times the level of UK import contraction
net of the 25% assumed to be supplied by the EU (USD 16,240 million). This
is close to double what Mercosur exported to the UK in 2016: USD 1,723
million. The following Table shows the main numbers supporting these back-
of-the-envelope estimates.
We remind that the extent to which Mercosur could potentially supply
these exports to the UK depends on a number of critical factors including
whether: (1) in fact the UK returns to the pre-Brexit level of agro-industrial
imports or close to it; (2) it can conclude an FTA with the UK at par with
other exporters like the Commonwealth countries to which the UK has
resorted in difficult times (Bromhead and others 2017); (3) it can meet the
stringent quality standards that will be demanded by the UK and, (4) it can
maintain its growth momentum by not discriminating against its exports as
Argentina did for a decade or so until late 2015.41
39 We net-out intra-EU trade under the assumption that most of it represents diversion created by the
high protective barriers of the CAP.
40 The US and Australia have quite similar shares to that of Mercosur’s but because these countries are
free of hoof and mouth disease ‘without vaccination’, they export beef at higher unit prices.
41 In response to high and discriminatory trade barriers including arbitrary export quotas that were
administered between 2006 and 2015, Argentina’s cattle stock declined by around 10 million heads
from 60 million while the export/output ratio declined from around 15% in the early millennium
years to 7% shortly before these barriers were lifted in late 2015 (Nogués 2015).
MERCOSUR’S NEGOTIATIONS WITH EUROPE 363
6 FINAL REMARK
We estimate that a HB would reduce UK agro-industrial imports from the EU
by around 50%. In the event of Brexit and the dismantling of the CAP, the UK
Government would adopt market-oriented agricultural policies and negotiate
FTAs seeking to minimize the impact on domestic food prices from leaving the
EU. How could Brexit impinge upon agricultural-exporting countries? We
offer an answer for Mercosur countries that have been negotiating an agree-
ment with the EU for close to two decades yet to no avail or worse, as
successive enlargements to several CEECs have increased its degree of self-
sufficiency in agro-industrial products. Also, and in addition to the role played
by highly protected and politically powerful interest groups on both sides
against a Mercosur-EU trade agreement, the discussion highlights other factors
that also underlie this failure.
If Mercosur members want to truly liberalize trade by gradually signing
successive FTAs as other countries in the region have successfully done so then
in the event of Brexit, the discussion suggests that they should consider giving
priority to the UK. Economic and non-economic considerations addressed in the
paper indicate that a Mercosur-UK FTA is likely to be attainable within a relatively
short period of time. Back-of-the-envelope numbers show that under such an
FTA these countries could close to double their agro-industrial exports to this
market. Nevertheless, failing to move decisively, this potential trade gain would be
lost to other exporting countries including Commonwealth members.
APPENDIX A BASIC DATA
For individual HS chapters Table A shows MFN tariffs and the proportional trade
impacts triggered by a HB.
Table A MFN Tariffs and Trade Reduction Effects of a HB
HS chapter Product MFN tariffs
Trade impact
of a HB
01 Live animals. 1.0% –19.0%
02 Meat and edible meat offal 49.3% –92.9%
03 Fish and crustaceans, etc. 8.4% –40.5%
04 Milk, dairy products, etc. 31.3% –66.7%
05 Products of animal origins. 0.0% –0.0%
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HS chapter Product MFN tariffs
Trade impact
of a HB
06
Live trees and other plants and
flowers.
4.2% –23.8%
07 Edible vegetables. 5.6% –42.8%
08 Fruits. 7.5% –35.7%
09 Coffee, tea, mate, etc. 4.1% –26.2%
10 Cereals. 45.7% –57.1%
11 Products of the milling industry, etc. 26.9% –88.1%
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits. 2.5% –6.6%
13 Lac; gums, resins, etc. 1.5% –7.2%
14 Vegetable planting materials, etc. 0.0% –0.0%
15 Animal and vegetable fats and oils. 6.5% –47.6%
16
Preparations of meat, fish, crustaceans,
etc.
33.3% –95.2%
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery. 42.0% –97.6%
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations. 11.8% –69.0%
19 Preparations of cereals, etc. 15.1% –85.7%
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, etc. 20.9% –88.1%
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations. 14.4% –87.0%
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar. 3.9% –38.1%
23
Residues and waste from the food
industry, etc.
19.0% –35.7%
24
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco
substitutes
38.1% –45.2%
Simple average of chapters 1 to 24 16.4% –49.8%
Simple average of chapters 25 to 99 4.0% –22.3%
Source: Columns 3 and 4 have been Inferred from Figures 3 and 8, and Figure 9 respectively
in Lawless y Morgenroth (2016).
The import demand elasticity for UK meat imports (em) has been computed by:
em=(ΔMm/Mm)/tm
where ΔMm/Mm is the proportional variation of meat imports (HS chapter 02)
listed in the last column of Table A, and tm is the MFN tariff rate listed in the third
column. Thus, for the meat chapter used in Table 6 em=−1.9.
MERCOSUR’S NEGOTIATIONS WITH EUROPE 365
APPENDIX B EU MFN MEAT TARIFFS
EU MFN tariffs for meats are a composite of ad-valorem and specific tariffs. The
ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) have been estimated following the guideline sug-
gested in European Commission (2005) according to which for product j:
AVEj=Sj/(0,25UVej+0,75UVwj) (a)
where S: specific tariff per unit; UVe: unit value of imports from the EU
and, UVw: unit value of imports from the rest of world. Given that most of
UK’s agro-industrial imports come from the EU we simplify to the following
expression:
AVEj=Sj/UVej (b)
In most cases, for each product there is a range of specific tariffs.
Consequently, several AVEs have been estimated by:
AVEj=[(Smaxj+Sminj)/2]/UVej (c)
where Smax and Smin are the maximum and minimum specific tariffs.
The third column of Table B shows ad valorem tariffs and the next four
columns the minimum, maximum and average specific tariffs in euros and
dollars. Following are the unit values estimated with 2016 trade data and the
final two columns show AVEs and our estimates of the EU MFN tariffs (ad
valorem plus specific). Estimates of AVEs are computed at the six-digit level
for the main trade positions and transformed to the four-digit level either by
simple correspondence (i.e. 0201, 0202, 0205 & 0210), or by simple average
of the main six digit positions (which was the case for 0203, 0204 and 0207).
These four digit estimates are then used in the text (Table 6) to simulate the
trade effects of a HB.
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